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Introduction  
 
Background  
Referring to the assortment of providers of policing services – from the public police to 
private security guards to the actions of citizens and communities – there is an extensive 
literature on the ‘pluralization’ of policing (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Loader, 2000; 
Crawford and Lister, 2004a,b; Crawford, 2008a,b; Stenning, 2000; 2009; Crawford, 2013). 
Indeed, the movement towards pluralisation, both internal and external to the public police, 
‘amount to the restructuring of policing in contemporary democratic societies’ (Bayley and 
Shearing, 1996: 585). Whilst the role of civil society within this restructuring is generally 
acknowledged, the spotlight of empirical inquiry tends to shine on the privatization of 
functions traditionally conducted by the public police, on the visible face of policing and on 
the array of patrol and guarding agents employed in spheres wider than the public police 
(Crawford, 2008a; 2013). Yet pluralisation goes further than this, often with little scrutiny 
(Crawford, 2008a). This article, focusing on the role of volunteers within the extended police 
family, starts to fill this empirical lacuna.  
 
Volunteers and the police service   
Volunteers – citizens who give time freely to benefit another person, group or cause (Wilson, 
2000: 215) – have long played a role in crime control. The informal mechanisms of social 
control, comprising the voluntary actions, habits and behaviours of ordinary citizens rather 
than those of paid agents of the state, characterised policing before the establishment of the 
New Police in 1829 (Reiner, 2000). Whilst the actions of salaried police constables came to 
displace those of volunteers (Crawford, 1999; Emsley, 2011), they did not entirely supersede 
them. For example, Special Constabularies – which comprise uniformed volunteer constables 
with full police powers (see Seth, 1961; Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Bryon, 1994; Gaston 
and Alexander, 2001; Whittle, 2014; Bullock, 2014; Bullock and Leeney, 2014) – have been 
formally allied to regular constabularies since the mid-19th century. The special constable was 
traditionally retained by constabularies as a ‘reserve’ to be deployed in times of emergency 
(Seth, 1961; Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Bryon, 1994) and today supplements and 
reinforces day-to-day police work in wide-ranging ways (Whittle, 2014; Bullock and Leeney, 
2014). More generally, citizens have been implored to take responsibility for their own 
security and that of their neighbourhoods and encouraged to work proactively with 
constabularies to resolve problems at the local level in contemporary times (Garland, 1996; 
Crawford, 1999; Bullock, 2014). Neighbourhood Watch – groups of citizens who band 
together and act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police – well embodies these practices 
(Rosenbaum, 1987; Laycock and Tilley, 1995; Bullock, 2014) as does community policing 
which calls for citizens to work proactively with constabularies to identify and resolve 
problems within neighbourhoods (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Bullock, 2014). 
Whilst different in emphasis, these forms of volunteering are now well established, the focus 
of this article – the Police Support Volunteer (henceforth PSV) – is somewhat different.  
 
The Police Support Volunteer (PSV) 
PSV programmes have been evident in England and Wales since the early 1990s. It seems 
that many early PSVs were public spirited citizens who spontaneously volunteered their time 
to staff public receptions in police stations that had been threatened with closure (Unison, 
2014). Associated with enthusiastic advocates, programmes have developed with little central 
or strategic oversight (Bullock, 2014). However, the Home Office started to promote PSV 
programmes in the early 2000s (Unison, 2014) and PSVs featured in government reports 
published in the decade that followed (e.g. Home Office, 2004; NPIA, 2008; Neuberger, 
2009). 
 
PSVs might be best characterised as ‘auxiliaries’ who support the functions of constabularies 
in ways that we will soon explore in detail. For the time being it suffices to say that PSVs 
have characteristics in common with other agents operating within constabularies but they are 
also distinctive. As they give their time for free, they resemble the aforementioned special 
constable. However, they are not sworn officers and they do not sport police powers. Non-
uniformed PSVs support the administration of constabularies and so resemble ‘civilian’ 
police staff whereas uniformed PSVs provide a visible police presence and so resemble 
Police Community Support officers (PCSOs). However, as volunteers they are of course 
unpaid.  
 
PSVs are a marginal but growing branch of the extended police family.  Unison (2014) 
reported that there were 9,000 PSVs in January 2014. By comparison there were some 
130,000 officers in the 43 geographical constabularies in England and Wales, 65,000 police 
staff, 14,000 PCSOs and 18,000 special constables at this time (ONS, 2013). Given that 
fewer than 4,000 PSVs were retained by constabularies in 2006 (Wilkins, 2008), their number 
has increased quickly. Whilst there is variety in respect to the numbers of PSVs retained by 
constabularies – Unison (2014) reported that Kent Constabulary had appointed 850 PSVs 
whereas Derbyshire Constabulary had secured just 15 – most constabularies intend to 
increase the number of PSVs (HMIC, 2013; Unison, 2014). As such it would seem to be 
timely to consider the ways that PSVs have been supporting constabularies, the ways that 
they are supported and managed and the extent to which they are integrated. Before we do, let 
us consider the rationale for the development of PSV programmes evident within official 
discourses.  
 
The rationale for Police Support Volunteer (PSV) programmes  
The proliferation of PSVs in contemporary constabularies should be understood as an 
outcome of dominant political ideologies which have called for a recalibration of the 
relationship between the state and the citizen and, more prosaically, economic pressures. Let 
us consider these in turn.  
 
First, powerful neo-liberal critiques have displaced the notion that paid state agents should be 
primary providers of security (Rose and Miller 1992; Garland 1996; O’Malley and Palmer 
1996); blending neo-liberalism and neo-communitarianism, calls to rebalance citizen rights 
against communal responsibilities have come to the fore (Giddens, 1998; Etzioni, 1995); and, 
strains of political thought which foreground the mobilisation of citizens to reinvigorate 
democratic structures have (re)emerged and become influential (Putnam, 2000). Indeed, PSV 
programmes developed within the context of the discourses of successive administrations – 
from across the political spectrum – which drew on the language of ‘rights’ and 
‘responsibilities,’ ‘self-policing’ and ‘active citizenship’ (Home Office, 2004; Neuberger, 
2009; Cabinet Office, 2010; Conservative Party, 2010). For New Labour, effective policing at 
the local level entailed ‘moving from traditional notions of policing simply by consent or 
people’s passive acquiescence, to policing with the proactive engagement and co-operation of 
communities’ (Home Office, 2004: 20). At the heart of the discourse of the Conservative-led 
coalition government was a commitment to the redistribution of power from the central state 
to communities and citizens. This language – sometimes referred to in Conservative Party 
discourse as the ‘Big Society’ – calls for ‘a radical redistribution of power away from 
Westminster and Whitehall to councils, communities and homes across the nation’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2010: 7). Calling for a ‘new national energy and commitment to social action’ 
(Conservative Party, 2010:1), rebuilding civic society has a central place in such discourse.  
 
Second, PSVs bolster the strength of constabularies and have been viewed as a cost-effective 
way of increasing capacity. Gravelle and Rogers (2009: 59) argue that ‘using volunteers 
could potentially save hundreds of thousands of pounds a year for the police service’ and that 
‘the possible economic savings are considerable, without allowing for the other diverse 
advantages attached to their use’. Although not all constabularies keep records of the hours 
given by PSVs, data obtained by Unison (2014) indicate that they can be considerable. For 
example, in 2013 PSVs gave Thames Valley Police 70,459 hours, West Yorkshire Police 
19,432 hours and Norfolk Constabulary 18,999  hours (Unison, 2014). It should be stressed 
that operating volunteer programmes is not free or even a cost neutral exercise. It is widely 
recognised that volunteer programmes need to be well resourced and effectively managed if 
they are to meet proffered outcomes (Brudney, 1999; Wilson and Pimm, 1996; Neuberger, 
2009), points which are returned to throughout this article. At the very least PSV programmes 
generate costs from advertising for and recruiting volunteers, providing induction and 
training, paying out-of-pocket expenses, hosting volunteer events (such as award 
ceremonies), overheads (such as access to Information Communication and Technology, desk 
space and support from Human Resources) and – perhaps most importantly – from their day-
to-day coordination, supervision and management. The true cost of deploying PSVs is 
unknown as many constabularies do not keep information and, since Norfolk Constabulary 
estimated the cost of operating their PSV programme in 2013 at £229,714 and 
Cambridgeshire Police at £0, there is a lack of consistent monitoring of costs (Unison, 2014). 
Come what may, equating volunteers and costs, and specifically equating volunteers with 
cost savings, is controversial, another theme we return to throughout this article.  
 
Methodological approach  
This article is informed by the findings of small-scale empirical study of the experiences of 
volunteers and those who work with them in one English constabulary. This constabulary has 
been operating a PSV programme since the mid-1990s and had in the order of 120 PSVs on 
the books at the time of writing. Data obtained by Unison indicate that this constabulary is in 
the ‘top ten’ in respect to the number of hours given by PSVs as a group and as individuals 
and the amount the force spends operating its PSV programme – indicating a buoyant 
programme. Within this constabulary PSVs conduct roles in fields as diverse as community 
engagement, cooperate communications, custody, emergency planning, customer service, 
events and licensing, vehicle maintenance, occupational health and victim support (Unison, 
2014). Indeed, the PSVs who participated in this study had or were conducting activities as 
diverse as valeting cars, managing data and conducting research, operating various watch 
schemes (Neighbourhood Watch, Farm Watch), staffing front counters, conducting victim 
satisfaction questionnaires, monitoring Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) 
systems, conducting filing and administration for different parts of the organisation 
(including the prosecution of criminal suspects) and representing (in uniform) constabularies 
at community and other outreach events, more detail on which shortly.  
 
Twenty qualitative interviews were conducted by the author between June and October 2013. 
Fourteen were PSVs and the remainder a mixture of police officers and other salaried staff 
who had experience of managing volunteers. Drawing on the principles of ‘key informant’ 
sampling (Parsons, 2008) participants were selected because of their knowledge and 
experience of working with volunteers and volunteering within this constabulary and beyond. 
Thus interviewees included members of the coordinating team, managers who had extensive 
experience of working with volunteers and volunteers who themselves had sustained service. 
Some interviewees held national positions as a result of their experience in the field. The 
point of sampling in this way was that interviewees could draw on their own experiences, 
attitudes and perspectives but also comment more broadly on the position of the volunteer 
within the service – and indeed nationally – by virtue of their familiarity with PSV 
programmes. To distinguish between the groups in reporting the results PSVs are referred to 
as 'volunteers’ and all others as 'managers'. To protect the anonymity of some of the 
participants, certain details have been obscured.  
 
It should be acknowledged at this early stage that the study is small scale and this might well 
function to limit what can be extrapolated to other constabularies and to limit what can be 
said with certainty. That said, as has been stressed the participants in the study were ‘experts’ 
which gives their observations some authority. In addition, efforts have also been made to 
link their observations with those of others who have written about the deployment of 
volunteers in the public sector in order to give the article greater depth. Either way a primary 
point of the article is to provide material about the development and operation of PSV 
programmes and to provoke questions about their deployment. This is an under researched 
area and it is hoped that this article will act as a spring board for further empirical 
interrogation. The following sections consider findings in respect to three themes: the nature 
of the roles that PSVs play and how these relate to roles played by other actors in the 
organisation; the coordination, training and supervision of PSVs; the degree to which PSVs 
are integrated into the organisation, accepted by other actors who work therein and the 
reasons why the promulgation of PSVs might be resisted by salaried staff. In the discussion, 
the implications for coordination, integration and effectiveness of policing and for regulation 
and accountability, themes which have long interested scholars of the pluralisation of 
policing, are considered. 
 
The position of Police Support Volunteers (PSVs) within contemporary constabularies  
 
The contours of the PSV role   
A great deal of policing scholarship has been given over to examination of what the police 
do. Given their novelty, let’s start by examining the roles that PSVs conduct and how these 
relate to those conducted by other actors within the organization. Whilst they may be a 
relatively new addition to the extended police family, it is clear that PSVs are playing wide 
ranging roles. Research published by Unison (2014) documents the range of roles conducted 
by PSVs across England and Wales. PSVs manage Neighbourhood Watch programmes, 
administer community consultation processes and distribute crime prevention advice. They 
enter data, conduct research and manage information. Volunteers deliver education 
programmes in schools and youth groups, compose and edit in-house newsletters and 
coordinate the activities of other volunteers. In some constabularies, volunteers greet visitors 
in reception, prepare and serve refreshments in restaurants and bars and act as museum 
coordinators. Volunteers help and assist with the grooming and training of horses, drive 
police vehicles between workshops and police stations and they dispatch animals into 
operational settings. In yet other sets of circumstances volunteers operate closed circuit 
television (CCTV) and Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems (ANPR). PSVs can be 
found providing administrative support in all areas of constabularies including offender 
management and major enquiry teams. In respect to the latter, in some constabularies 
volunteers are used to monitor CCTV images, review cold case evidence, leaflet and conduct 
administration on behalf of detectives. Volunteers assist forensics departments by carrying 
out fingerprint techniques, repackaging exhibits after testing, updating databases and assisting 
senior technicians. In some constabularies volunteers attend minor scenes of crimes, on a call 
out rota, to provide reassurance to victims, undertake crime scene examinations and provide 
crime prevention advice. 
 
Given the wide ranging nature of the PSV role, it is pertinent to ask how these relate to roles 
played by officers and other actors in the organisation. National guidance has stressed that 
volunteers should complement, rather than replace or displace, the activities of police officers 
and staff; should help ‘free up’ salaried staff to perform key operational duties; and, should 
‘add value’ by undertaking activities that police officers and staff would not ordinarily have 
the capacity to do (NPIA, 2008; Gravelle and Rogers, 2009; Unison, 2014). More 
specifically, guidance indicates that PSVs should perform ‘back office’ tasks which ‘free’ 
officers to focus on the ‘front line’ (NPIA, 2008; Gravelle and Rogers, 2009; Unison, 2014). 
Reflecting these official guidelines participants in this study tended to draw a distinction 
between the ‘front line’ and the ‘back office’ when considering the roles that were suitable 
for PSVs or otherwise and how the PSV fitted in to the organization. The implication – more 
or less explicit within the interview data – is that ‘back office roles’ are suitable for PSVs 
whereas ‘front line’ ones are not. To demonstrate, reflecting on her role providing 
administration for one area of the organization one PSV noted that doing so enabled regular 
officers to ‘get on and fight crime: that is what they are supposed to do’ (volunteer 1). 
Another, who conducted data analysis on behalf of specialist unit, noted that ‘by me taking it 
over it means they can go out on the road rather sit at a desk all day, its freed officers to go 
out on the road’ (volunteer 2). 
 
Given that the notion of a policing ‘front line’ is ambiguous and contested a distinction 
between ‘front line’ and ‘back office’ policing is disingenuous at the point of principle. As 
Manning (2013: 26) put it, ‘like the army, there is a necessary ratio of office staff to ‘‘front 
line’’ that is essential in order to keep records, deal with the public in situations, manage 
human resources, make and keep budgets and carry out legal and scientific analyses’. It is 
also disingenuous at the point of practice. Providing a uniformed presence within 
communities, collating intelligence to support proactive and reactive investigations and 
providing administration to support the prosecution of criminal suspects, it is quite clear that 
PSVs are conducting roles that go well to the heart of what is conventionally understood as 
‘front line’ policing. Taking even a narrow view of the ‘front line’, PSVs form part of it. The 
ambiguous distinction between the ‘front line’ and the ‘back office’ is to all intents and 
purposes irrelevant. 
 Conducting ‘back office’ functions such as administration, filing and staffing receptions, the 
roles performed by many PSVs resemble those performed by non-uniformed police staff. 
Referring to the temporary workers, generally provided by an agency, who provide short term 
cover for permanent members of staff when they are unavailable due say to holiday or 
maternity leave, one participant characterised some PSVs as ‘Free Temps’: 
 
A free temp. You only have to look at the job descriptions. This is clearly what they 
are. Yes, they are free temps (volunteer 3).  
 
Whilst guidelines issued by the Home Office and the College of Policing (Unison, 2014) state 
that PSVs should not replace salaried staff, concerns have been raised that PSVs are now 
being used in this way (Gravelle and Roberts, 2009; Unison, 2014). In drawing attention to 
the sheer range of roles performed by PSVs Unison (2014: 4) argue that volunteering ‘spills 
over into areas that were previously the preserve of directly employed, highly trained, vetted 
and skilled police employees’. To illustrate, reflecting on the administrative tasks that one 
PSV participating in the present study stated ‘it could quite easily be a part-time civilian job’ 
(volunteer 4). Certainly within this constabulary the deployment of volunteers is viewed as a 
pragmatic response to the economic reality and it accepted that PSVs sustain and support 
functions that the constabulary would otherwise be unable to provide due to budget cuts. One 
manager, who deployed large numbers of PSVs into administrative roles noted: 
 
It’s all about cut backs, isn’t it? Cut backs, losing money, losing budgets. They have 
got no admin staff. The fact that we have volunteers in to help, oh! It just makes it so 
much easier (manager 1) 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the risk that they would be resented for appearing to occupy 
the roles of salaried staff who had been made redundant was a primary theme within the 
accounts of PSVs, a theme to which we turn shortly.  
 
On the face of it, the roles performed by PSVs might best resemble the administrative roles 
conducted by non-uniformed police staff. However, PSVs also conduct tasks that resemble 
those of uniformed officers and staff. In this constabulary many PSVs who directly engage 
with citizens wear a uniform. Uniformed PSVs play a wide range of roles on behalf of this 
constabulary. They attend community events, such as fetes and fairs, chat to citizens with the 
aim of exchanging information, raising awareness and providing reassurance. They go into 
schools and youth clubs and speak to young people about the role of the police and give 
presentations on safety. They attend Neighbourhood Watch meetings on behalf of 
constabularies providing updates for members and issuing crime prevention advice. They 
conduct property marking in a wide range of settings including in the homes and businesses 
of citizens. They deliver newsletters and leaflets. These roles are similar to those conducted 
by actors within Neighbourhood Policing teams which, reflecting the rhetoric of community 
policing, seek to raise visibility, promote reassurance and engender interaction with citizens. 
Most clearly, they are similar roles to those performed by PSCOs. PCSOs provide visible, on-
foot patrol in local communities and otherwise aim to reduce demands made of police 
officers by completing tasks that do not require the powers of sworn officers (O’Neill, 
2014a). Indeed, so similar are the functions provided by uniformed PSVs and other 
uniformed policing teams that ‘blue-on-blue’ situations – where Neighbourhood Policing 
teams attended the same community events independently of the teams of PSV – were 
reported. At the time of writing, the coordination of PSVs and Neighbourhood Policing teams 
is being formalised within this constabulary at least. It seems quite possible that uniformed 
PSVs will be assimilated into Neighbourhood Policing teams, something which may come to 
signify a further development in the evolution of forms of visible patrol and reassurance 
policing within Anglo-Welsh policing.  
In the context of this blurring there is risk that citizens and other actors within the police 
family will be confused about the PSV role. Citizens are sometimes confused about the roles 
and responsibilities of PSVs. Something especially apparent where PSVs were in uniform. 
The uniform is reportedly important for PSVs who interact face-to-face with citizens to 
promote credibility and professionalism. One noted ‘if they are trying to promote the police, 
wearing the uniform gives increased credibility (volunteer 11) and another ‘this is a 
professional organization, if we are interacting with the public we need to look professional’ 
(volunteer 1). Uniformed PSVs were drawing attention to the ‘symbolic power’ (Loader, 
1997) embodied by the police uniform that marks them as part of the police family and 
commands respect. However, it can also function to muddle their status. Reflecting research 
which has demonstrated that citizens are not always able to distinguish between the actors in 
the extended police family and express confusion regarding the various roles and the powers 
available to them (Crawford, 2008b; Rowland and Coupe, 2014), participants in this study 
indicated that citizens make little distinction between uniformed PSVs and other uniformed 
actors in the organisation. In the absence of clarity over the responsibilities and limitations of 
the PCSO role, Crawford (2008b: 155) noted that ‘the public are often left to assume that 
they can act like police constables’. He went on to explain that on the one hand this may 
furnish PCSOs with a reassurance premium but on the other hand may give false expectations 
regarding what they can legitimately achieve (Crawford, 2008b). These themes were 
certainly present in the accounts of PSVs who participated in the present study. Agreeing that 
‘to all intents and purposes we look like police officers’ one volunteer, whose role was to 
property mark as part of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme, noted that: 
 
If they want real advice, if they have a real problem well I am not qualified to give 
them that advice. That would be tricky, it would. So I am always keen to say that 
proper officers should go and do that side of it. Even though I say ‘look I am a 
volunteer’ the minute they see the uniform they forget that. In terms of actual ability 
to give advice, other than common sense advice, I can’t give any (Volunteer 7) 
 
This muddling raises questions about how PSVs, less experienced and less well trained than 
salaried staff, deal with such requests for assistance. As the quote above indicates PSVs 
tended to stress that they would give ‘common sense’ advice if the matter was 
straightforward or refer them to salaried staff if the matter were more complex. Whilst this 
might seem fairly intuitive it should not be assumed that referrals will happen. As we will 
soon examine in more detail many PSVs work away from the direct gaze of salaried staff in 
the organisation, something which can render it difficult for PSVs to follow up queries raised 
by citizens. This extract illustrates the potential problems that can occur when PSVs are 
removed from other actors in the organisation: 
 
I believe it is organized now, but I did find  that  there was just no one to refer any 
questions to. Things that needed following up, like people wanting their property back 
that had been taken for evidence. There was no one to go to.  No one at all to ask to 
follow these queries up. I didn’t know quite what to do with them. I wanted them 
followed up as otherwise it made the police look bad. So that first year wasn’t really 
terribly successful. It wasn’t particularly a pleasant experience for me and I felt that as 
a volunteer I didn’t want to be doing something that had adverse repercussions for 
me. I know that sounds awful. But you want the feeling that you are helping someone 
and are contributing not the feeling that you had let someone down (volunteer 7)  
The status of the PSV can also be confusing for other actors within the organisation. Some 
express surprise when confronted by PSVs. One volunteer, explaining her role conducting 
administration for CID noted, ‘A lot of the officers are very surprised, they are very shocked 
[…] I spent the first two weeks explaining what I was who I was, explaining’ (volunteer 3). 
Another PSV, who explained his role as a ‘data analyst’, tended to obscure the fact that he 
was a volunteer to avoid other actions in the organisation questioning his role: 
 
A lot of the officers don’t know because my boss said ‘don’t put it on the email that 
you are a volunteer’, which I don’t do, it says ‘data analyst’ […] They don’t realize 
that volunteers like me do this work (volunteer 2)  
 
More specifically, there can be confusion about what information PSVs can and cannot have 
access to. In the context that many areas of police business involves access to sensitive 
information about victims, offenders and the progression of criminal investigations, one 
police manager noted that salaried staff question ‘what they are allowed to see, what can’t 
they see’ (manager 6). There can also be confusion about the boundaries of the PSV role. The 
hours worked by PSVs is structured more by their inclination rather than the requirements of 
the organisation and can be erratic:   
 
I have had cases where I have had to say to officers sorry I can’t do this today you 
will have to wait until tomorrow because I am finishing for the day …. It might be 
midday and they say well aren’t you paid to work and I say I am volunteer I am not 
working you have to wait. We have had instances of that where people assume that 
you get paid (volunteer 2) 
 
The coordination, management and supervision of Police Support Volunteers (PSVs) 
As Bayley and Shearing (1996) note the increasing use of civilians in police work has 
important implications for the management and organization of constabularies. Indeed, given 
that PSVs conduct activities across the spectrum of police work and represent constabularies 
in wide ranging ways the ways that PSVs are coordinated, managed and supervised deserve 
consideration, let us consider these themes now.  
 It is generally acknowledged that a paid volunteer manager or coordinator is essential to 
facilitate the development of successful volunteer programmes within public (and other) 
sector organisations (Brudney, 1999; Rochester et al, 2010). The PSV programme within this 
constabulary was coordinated by a small team at the time that the research was conducted. 
This team oversaw the generation of new PSV placements; managed recruitment and 
induction processes; provided support for supervisors; organised reward ceremonies and 
other formal and informal events for volunteers; produced and distributed a magazine aimed 
at highlighting their achievements; and, communicated with PSVs, handled their queries and 
provided additional support. The team, seen as highly committed, was admired and much 
valued by participants in the study who felt their activities and support were essential to the 
operation of the PSV programme:  
[named individual] is such a good manager. She’s great. They have these awards in 
the year. So that’s good. There is big recognition of people and what they achieve 
(Volunteer 7) 
However, the central team was not responsible for the day-to-day management and 
supervision of PSVs, which was devolved to the local teams who deployed them. It is 
acknowledged that volunteers should be managed and supported by the organisations that 
retain them and indeed for some commentators there is an obligation for organisations to do 
so (Rochester et al, 2010). This constabulary issues guidelines to local managers, guidelines 
which are similar to those provided by other constabularies (Wilkins, 2008). They state that 
PSVs should be trained, well-integrated into their team, should receive feedback on their 
performance and have an annual review. However, there is variation regarding whether 
guidelines are applied. Certainly, not all PSVs receive training. One manager explained:  
 
If they are doing admin upstairs then yes, they get the training. But it doesn’t 
necessarily extend. It’s expensive if they are going to do just one day a week 
(manager 2).  
 
It is not always possible to offer training for those who need it. As the quote above indicates, 
training incurs costs which needs to be balanced against the nature of the role being 
performed, the number of hours the PSV works for and acknowledgement that they may not 
be retained by the organisation for long. Even where it is agreed that a PSV needs training it 
might be time-consuming to arrange. One problem is that PSVs work flexible and limited 
hours which may or may not correspond with training course schedules. One PSV noted: 
‘yes, it was like picking through a minefield but yes eventually I did get bits and bobs of 
training’ (Volunteer 7).  
 
Typically there is limited formal oversight of the activities and outputs of PSVs. One 
manager explained:  
 
Do you know, they don’t require that much from us because you know they come in 
and do their job and it they have any queries they will call us or come and find us. But 
other than that they are sort of independent (manager 2) 
As we have seen, some PSVs are geographically and temporally located away from the gaze 
of salaried employees. Some volunteers work at home, others work remotely in the 
community and yet others work in the evenings and at the weekends. These arrangements suit 
many PSVs who are in full time employment but they are times when regular officers and 
other salaried staff are less likely to be available to oversee their activities. Accordingly, for 
some the supervision of volunteers involves an occasional ‘check in’, sometimes by email or 
‘phone. This PSV illustrates:  
 
He does 7am to 3pm. I certainly don’t start that early but I sometimes catch him in the 
afternoon. But he’s extremely busy. We’ll touch base once or twice a week I’d say. I 
often go in at the weekend to be honest. Its quieter. I can get a PC. I might do 4 hours 
on a Sunday just to catch up on email (Volunteer 7) 
The volunteer might not receive a great deal of feedback on their performance: 
 
Very little feedback, to be honest. A lot of work, very little feedback […] very, very 
frustrating  […] its only that, you know, but you know we had to prepare a big report 
but, you know, there is not a lot coming back the other way (volunteer 6) 
Potentially, there are a number of implications both for the volunteer and the organisation. 
The volunteer might not feel that their contribution is valued. That volunteers need feedback 
to help ensure that they feel valued and so are retained is a theme clear in the wider literature 
regarding the management of volunteers (Wilson and Pimm, 1996; Rochester et al, 2010), a 
theme picked up by a number of participants in this study. One PSV noted ‘unless managers 
give positive feedback they will feel not wanted and fade away’ (volunteer 5). It also raises 
questions about how the work of volunteers is scrutinised, developed and improved. This 
brings us to matters about the quality of the work conducted by PSV. Poor performance was 
generally not thought to be a problem by those participating in this study. Participants tended 
to agree that on the whole volunteers were intrinsically motivated and that there would be 
little point in volunteering if you did not intend to contribute. One PSV noted, ‘you would be 
a bit of a fool to volunteer if you didn’t enjoy it, you would vote with your feet’ (Volunteer 
5). Even so, reliability did feature in the observations of those who participated in this study, 
as this manager indicates:   
The biggest issue is that you can’t hold them accountable because there is no 
authority. Some of the younger members, they give last minute notice because they 
have an exam. They just wouldn’t turn up. It was about getting them to be 
accountable. That is the difference between paid staff and volunteers (manager 1) 
 
As the quote suggests, the police organisation is somewhat powerless in the face of 
unreliability. Much of this comes down to the informal position of volunteers and the nature 
of the authority that the organisation holds over them. The manager previously quoted 
concluded that for paid staff ‘if you don’t turn up, if you go [Absent Without Leave], there 
are policies and procedures’ but ‘if you are a volunteer and you don’t turn up there is not 
much you can do’ (manager 1). Faith is placed in any problems being resolved locally and 
informally. Whilst guidance suggests that complaints about the performance, conduct or 
demeanour of a PSV need to be dealt with transparently, quickly and effectively to protect 
other volunteers, other actors in the organisation and the reputation of constabularies,  it also 
reinforces the point that standard discipline and grievance procedures should not apply to 
volunteers. Reflecting on his experience with dealing with unmotivated PSVs, this manager 
explained that:  
 
Mostly it’s an adult conversation. You’re not doing what we want. It’s an adult 
conversation. Please hand in your badge (manager 6) 
 
In more serious cases of misconduct guidance indicates that an appointment could be 
proactively terminated. However, it seems that it is more usual for PSVs who are 
unmotivated or performing under par to just ‘drift off’ (manager 6). It might be becoming 
clear that the processes of coordinating, managing and supervising volunteers within 
constabularies – as in other public sector organisations – are not straightforward ones. This 
section concludes with a consideration of some of the challenges.  
 
Establishing processes through which to regulate PSVs, to manage their output and to support 
them may prove to be a primary challenge for contemporary constabularies. There is 
something of a tension when considering the matter of the regulation of PSVs. It is their 
informal status that enables constabularies to recruit volunteers relatively easily and at a 
relatively low cost and so from which many of the mooted benefits of utilizing them are 
assumed to flow. To formalise the relationship between volunteers and the organisations that 
deploy them risks undermining these proffered advantages. Indeed, formal processes risk 
altering the ‘contractual’ nature of the relationship between volunteers and the host 
organisation (Wilson and Pimm, 1996; Brudney, 1999; Wilson, 2000; Restall, 2005; 
Rochester et al 2010). However, managers will have to find ways to motivate volunteers to 
achieve certain outputs in lieu of pay and formal management processes. One manager noted 
‘You can’t apply same set of rules to unpaid and paid staff but the issue is how you balance 
that with ensuring tasks are done’ (manager 5). Such is the nature of the rank structure that 
some who manage PSVs assume that you can issue orders or instructions to PSVs, widely 
understood to be unacceptable practice within the management of volunteers (Wilson and 
Pimm, 1996; Wilson, 2000).  Indeed, one PSV argued that ‘you cannot express the attitude ‘I 
am the boss just do it’ you need to ‘enthuse, support and encourage volunteers’ (volunteer 
12).  
 
Compounding this, a ‘one size fits all’ is unlikely to be appropriate for the management of 
PSVs. It is understood that the motivations and expectations of volunteers can be highly 
varied, even where they are working for the same organisation (Bussell and Forbes, 2002). 
Volunteers are motivated to participate for very different reasons, they anticipate different 
forms of ‘reward’ and they are prepared to work different numbers of hours. In managing 
volunteers understanding and responding to these varied motivations is important. PSVs are 
clearly differently motivated. However, speaking broadly participations tended to draw 
attention to two groups of PSVs: ‘an older group near or who are retired and a younger group 
who are looking for roles in the service and not much between’ (volunteer 4). Either to test 
the water to get relevant experience to put on a CV, that younger PSVs were motivated by 
future paid positions was clear: 
 
I’d always wanted to be a detective! I was thinking I would go and see what it was 
like and maybe I would apply to be a police officer. I have decided to go into the 
civilian side of it. I have got into it to see if I like it (volunteer 9)  
 
Older volunteers ‘want to do their bit to help, to understand or to give something back’ 
(manager 6) but nevertheless also have personal reasons for doing volunteering too: 
 
I had always been interested in helping, if you like, but I always liked the office. 
Because I miss work but for various reasons it was not possible for me to go back to 
work. So I am looking to replace that I suppose (volunteer 7) 
 
Volunteers are also willing and/or able to work very different numbers of hours. Balancing 
the work loads of PSVs can be problematic. Many PSVs are enthusiastic, which ironically 
can generate problems. On the one hand, furnishing eager PSVs with sufficient work can be 
difficult. ‘You can drive volunteers away, they don’t want to be twiddling their thumbs’ 
stated one manager (manager 6). On the other hand, eager volunteers might become 
overburdened. Guidance states that volunteers should work no more than forty hours a 
month. This reflects the doctrine – oft-stated in volunteer management literature – that that if 
a volunteer was indispensable it indicates that a permanent and salaried position is needed. 
Something acknowledged by participants in this study. One manager stated ‘If the business of 
the unit would collapse if the volunteer left it indicates it is not for the volunteer – the 
volunteers should not be central to but adding to’ (manager 3). Data obtained by Unison 
(2014) indicate that PSVs in this constabulary work on average about 22 hours a month – 
clearly within the recommended range. However, there is variance. One participant stated 
that he did a six or seven hour day most days: ‘I can’t finish it all in one day’ he explained 
(volunteer 2). Effective volunteer management requires that managers understand the benefits 
that individual volunteers expect to reap in order to tailor support towards these specific 
needs (Wilson and Pimm, 1996; Brudney, 1999; Rochester et al, 2010).   
 
The integration of Police Support Volunteers (PSVs) into constabularies  
Like most families, the policing family is not always a harmonious one. It is one riven with 
jealousies, enmity, competition, conflict and lack of mutual respect and common goals 
(Stenning, 2009: 23). Certainly, whilst PSVs are diffused throughout this constabulary, there 
are questions about the extent to which they are integrated into the organisation and accepted 
by other actors within, themes discussed in the following sections.  
 
Whether PSVs are accepted by those with whom they work and the others within the 
organisation seems to vary. Certainly some PSVs feel well integrated into their teams, 
accepted by them and valued: ‘people are always very grateful [my manager] says don’t ever 
leave!’ (volunteer 2). Points reflected by managers: ‘they are part of the team and I get 
annoyed with people who don’t think so’ (manager 1). However, as the quote suggests, some 
in the organisation view PSVs sceptically. Scepticism can be generated by their novelty, 
feeling that they are temporary, their amateur status and ‘threat’ to paid positions. One 
volunteer noted:  
 
Well I am lucky here because my neighbourhood officers are lovey and they know 
where the coffee is!  It does vary, generally its good, but it does vary. What I have 
heard, where they are working at a desk, they are ignored. That has happened, and I 
can remember it, when you have a temporary member of staff in ‘they are only temps’ 
(volunteer 1) 
 
One police manager likened scepticism of PSVs to early scepticism of PCSOs, uniformed 
axillary staff who were introduced to the police family at the turn of the century. Born of a 
lack of clarity about their position, limited training and poor supervision PCSOs, this 
manager explained, experienced a degree of estrangement from the police family (see also 
Kempa and Johnston, 2005; Johnston, 2005; 2007; O’Neill, 2014a, b). Whilst there is still 
some resistance to PCSOs, officers who have experienced first-hand what benefits they can 
bring to the organisation tend to support them (O’Neill, 2014b: 26). Similar points have been 
made about the relationship between special and regular officers. There is a volume of work 
which points to a troubled history of relations between special and regular officers (Seth, 
1961; Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Bryon, 1994; Bullock, 2014; Bullock and Leeney, 
2014). However, there is complexity and many special constables report positive relations 
with regular officers, especially where they work closely with them (Bullock and Leeney, 
2014). In this vein, participants in this study generally felt that those who worked closely 
with them valued PSVs.  ‘Those who had used volunteers would use them again and again 
and again’, noted one manager (manager 6). Reflecting on whether volunteers were 
assimilated into his team one volunteer stated ‘they seem to be accepted but then they have 
been there for a while’ (volunteer 6). The implication is that as regular police staff became 
used to working with them they would gradually become assimilated. Indeed, some 
interviewees suggested that constabularies should work to expedite this process through 
raising awareness:  
 
I think we need to get more of a message out there. Police officers or managers are 
probably less likely to use volunteers than police staff members. That might be a 
generalization. But I think we could do more to drive out what volunteers do what 
options there are. I am not sure other people know what volunteers can do (manager 
1) 
 
However, arguing that such promotion would function to raise suspicion and anxieties 
amongst salaried staff, others disagreed. This point links to the extent to which salaried staff 
view PSVs as a threat to job security, a matter to which we now turn.  
 
Threat to job security is a very clear reason why there might be resistance to the introduction 
of PSVs. Indeed, the nature of the relationship between volunteers and new actors within 
constabularies is likely to be shaped in part by the economic and political context of the day. 
Certainly, regular officers have perceived special constables to be a threat to any 
improvements in their pay and conditions and to the availability of paid overtime (Seth, 1961; 
Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Bryon, 1994; Gaston and Alexander, 2001). More broadly, 
officers may well resent the use of what they see as a cheaper alternative, a theme that has 
endured. Seth (1961: 187) provides the example of a letter to police review published 8th 
April 1932 which stated:  
 
In the minds of certain would-be economists the special constables are looked upon as 
a cheap and inexpensive auxiliary Force whose services as police officers are to be 
utilised wherever possible so that the Regular Police may be maintained at minimum 
strength. It is not surprising that on this view of the matter the Specials should not 
always be regarding with great favour by the Regular Police in the long run.  
 
Some thirty years later, Leon (1991) drew attention to the hostile reaction of the Police 
Federation, which represents rank and file police officers in England and Wales, to the 
suggestion that special constables might be used to fill gaps in provision created by resource 
constraints. Given that until relatively recently the number of PSVs has been small and the 
areas into which they have been deployed limited, it seems that few questions were asked 
about whether the deployment of PSVs had implications for salaried staff. Clearly this 
landscape has shifted. PSVs are being widely deployed at a time when constabularies are 
facing deep cuts to their budgets and accordingly at a time when positions are being lost and 
some salaried staff are facing redundancy.  It would be surprising if there was not cynicism 
regarding the rationale for developing the role of the volunteer in this context. Indeed, the 
risk that the promotion of PSVs at the current time would be seen as job substitution was ever 
present in accounts of participants in this study. One volunteer explains.  
 
The other thing is as well is that initially some people think ‘you are taking someone’s 
job’. There is always a risk of that. That can be difficult. That is why I am careful 
about what I will and won’t do. If I think that it is a police officer’s responsibility, I 
will say ‘I don’t think I should be doing this’ (volunteer 4)  
Discussion and conclusion   
 
Whilst PSVs programmes have become established within constabularies and the numbers of 
PSVs have multiplied we know little about the ways that they are integrated into police 
organisations or the implications for the provision of effective policing services. This article 
sought to modestly add to our knowledge of the development of PSV programmes and the 
deployment of PSVs in contemporary constabularies focusing on the roles that PSVs play, 
their management and supervision and the nature of their integration into the organisation. In 
so doing it sought to extend our understanding of the pluralisation of policing in the context 
that research on volunteers is limited. In this final section the findings of this article are 
considered in light of the frameworks of plural policing. Within a differentiated patchwork of 
paid and unpaid, sworn and unsworn actors, key concerns for scholars of plural policing has 
been the implications for effectiveness, coordination and integration along with matters to do 
with regulation and governance.  
 
There has been recognition that the policing landscape is characterised by an ever-growing 
variety of state and non-state providers and ‘that the responsibility for policing provision in 
liberal democratic societies is now in practice shared between a growing plethora of 
governmental and non-governmental providers’ (Stenning, 2009: 21). Whilst much focus has 
been on the privatisation of public policing, this article has shed light on how volunteers are 
encroaching into spaces once occupied by paid agents within police organisations. This has to 
be understood within the context of a wider political project that seeks to reconfigure the 
relationship between the state and the citizen. Fundamentally this project is undermining the 
expectation that the state – or agents of the state – will provide services to citizens. Instead, 
the expectation is that citizens will play a role in the provision of these services. Indeed, this 
article has illustrated that volunteers are a growing component of the mixed economy of 
policing. This goes beyond traditional understanding of how constabularies co-produce crime 
control with citizens. Conventional mechanisms of co-production – say via Neighbourhood 
Watch programmes and forms of consultation – keeps citizens more or less at arm’s length. 
In contrast, PSV programmes bring citizens to the heart of constabularies. PSVs resemble 
officers and staff in terms of appearance and the tasks that they perform. They are playing 
wide ranging roles that go well to the heart of what is typically understood as ‘front line’ 
policing and some are occupying roles once filled by paid staff. This starts to blur – literally 
and symbolically – the boundaries between paid officers and staff and volunteers. Indeed, the 
mixed economy of policing is perhaps best understood as an ‘interplay’ between state and 
non-state actors (Crawford, 2008a; Stenning, 2009). Indeed, it may be increasingly the case 
that the enactment of crime control – even under the umbrella of the public police – needs to 
be understood as the outcome of the interplay between paid and non-paid actors. However, 
this blurring is not without certain implications, to which we now turn.  
 
Pluralizing the sources of policing affects quantity and quality (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). 
In respect to the former, as a branch of the extended police family PSVs are in a minority but 
with some 9,000 on the books in early 2014 (Unison, 2014) they are clearly adding strength. 
In respect to the latter, if furnished in furtherance of public safety the actions of the various 
actors that make up contemporary constabularies might be expected to add up to more than 
the sum of its parts (Crawford, 2008a). However, we do not know what impact they are 
having on the ability of constabularies to meet organisational aims. Whilst it is generally 
accepted that public sector organisations should evaluate the impact of their volunteer 
programmes (Brudney, 1999), there is little evidence that this is happening in respect to PSV 
programmes (Unison, 2014).  
In considering whether the deployment of PSVs is likely to improve public safety, inevitably 
much will depend on how they are coordinated, deployed and supported. There has been 
recognition that coordination of actors within the mixed economy of policing has been poor 
and that the field has developed unevenly (Crawford, 2008a). Similar themes are evident 
within the realm of PSV programmes. There has been limited strategic oversight at the 
central level (Wilkins, 2008; NPIA, 2010; Bullock, 2014) and local programmes are not 
always overseen by a coordinator (Wilkins, 2008). Indeed, whilst the activities of PSVs in the 
constabulary that was the focus of the present study were coordinated by a much respected 
team, it was disbanded after the research was conducted, presumably because of budget 
constraints. There are also questions about how PSVs are deployed and the nature of the 
contribution they make. PSVs can be characterised as a fluid resource over which 
constabularies have little authority. Constabularies cannot require PSVs to perform certain 
duties and must allow them autonomy to determine the hours they work. In turn, PSVs are 
more or less dependable, they are prepared to work more or less hours and are retained for 
very different periods of time. This may influence whether PSVs affect the ability of 
constabularies to provide a consistent and coherent service. Whilst many PSVs are no doubt 
contributing, this article has drawn attention to poor harmonisation between PSVs and other 
actors and teams within the organisation and confusion about their roles and position in the 
organisation. In addition, some PSVs and indeed some teams of PSVs are working 
autonomously from other actors in the organisation. All of this is potentially troubling not 
least because it raises questions about the quality of their contribution and it raises the risk of 
duplication and poor coordination. At the very least this indicates that attention needs to be 
given to how PSVs are organised and their activities harmonised.  
If members of the extended police family are ‘to facilitate police sovereignty over security 
governance, they must be integrated successfully with their newly adopted ‘family’ members’ 
(Kempa and Johnston, 2005: 183). Integrating new members into the police family has not 
always been straightforward as evidenced by the experiences of PSCOs (Kempa and 
Johnston, 2005; O’Neill, 2014a,b) and special constables (Seth, 1991; Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-
Black and Bryon, 1994; Bullock, 2014; Bullock and Leeney, 2014). Born of their novelty, 
their amateur status and the potential implications for paid positions, it is far from clear that 
PSVs are integrated into the wider police family at the time of writing. Indeed, writing at a 
time of state contraction a major risk to the effective deployment of PSV programmes is 
scepticism from other actors in the police family. Rationalising reorganisation and 
retrenchment with recruiting ever more PSVs may well be a problem and is a matter that 
needs sensitive handling. Gravelle and Roberts (2009) noted that the deployment of several 
hundred PSVs in one English constabulary was put on hold in the context of union concerns 
about the implications for paid positions. Indeed, in the context of an ongoing force 
reorganisation, the recruitment of volunteers in this constabulary was (temporarily) on hold at 
the time of writing. The anxiety of salaried staff formally acknowledged.  
 
Regulation – especially as it relates to the market for private security and the privatisation of 
functions traditionally allied to the public police – has been a dominant theme within the 
literature on pluralisation (Crawford and Lister,  2004 a,b; Stenning, 2000; 2009). Whilst it is 
far from the case that new additions to the extended policing family are unregulated 
(Stenning, 2000; 2009), pluralisation undoubtedly ‘interrupts’ our understanding of 
established patterns of regulation (Loader, 2000). The reason for this is that the indirect (e.g. 
legal, political, administrative and financial) and direct (e.g. local consultation arrangements) 
forms of accountability that oversee the public police  do not typically apply or are weakly 
applied (Crawford and Lister, 2004b). Indeed, whilst there has been recognition that the 
enactment of policing is characterised by an ever-growing variety of state and non-state 
policing providers the implications for the provision of public policing and effective 
governance and accountability of policing have not as yet been sufficiently acknowledged 
and explored (Stenning, 2009; Loader, 2000). This is something that certainly applies to 
PSVs and other volunteers within the policing family.  
 
Unlike the actors who provide policing functions within private organisations, PSVs are 
clearly situated firmly within the public police. However, they are also they are also removed 
from the processes that typically regulate actors therein. This article has drawn attention to 
how the position of the PSV is an informal one. The mechanisms through which PSVs are 
regulated are fragile. Where performance bedevils organisational expectations, leeway will 
typically be shown and formal disciplinary action is avoided. The police organisation has 
limited authority over the PSV, inevitably leading to questions about their regulation.  
 
Recognising that PSV represent them in wide ranging ways and in light of literature which 
promotes ‘best practice’ in volunteer management, guidelines which seek to structure the 
recruitment and management of PSVs have been produced by constabularies. However, in 
and of themselves ‘light touch’ this article has drawn attention to how these are applied more 
or less proactively. Throughout this article, it has been emphasised that constabularies should 
not be looking to establish systems of management that simply mirror those of salaried staff. 
Instead, constabularies will have to develop new ways to support volunteers and will need to 
work flexibly to understand the varied motivations and expectations of volunteers and tailor 
the processes and practices of oversight, development and review to them. Whilst 
constabularies have recognised that the traditional quasi-military management model, based 
on ranks and a clear chains of command, may not accommodate the requirements of modern 
policing and has been talking about the value of participative and collegial management 
(Bayley and Shearing, 1996: 591), constabularies will have to think carefully about the 
introduction of forms of management suitable for volunteers.  
 
All of this links to matters of accountability. Systems of oversight are one way through which 
actors in the extended police family are held to account (Manning, 2013), systems minimally 
developed and applied to volunteers as has been stressed. However, systems of redress are 
also important. At present, in the event of a complaint about the demeanour or conduct of a 
volunteer or the quality of the service they provide there will be little recompense for a 
citizen or indeed for the constabularies that volunteers represent (Fredericksen and Levin, 
2004). Since PSVs do not sport coercive powers and cannot directly enforce the laws of the 
land, the risk posed might appear to be minimal. However, as has been demonstrated, the 
contours of the role are poorly defined and there is blurring between salaried and non-salaried 
positions. They also represent constabularies in wide ranging ways. The informal status of 
volunteers affords constabularies benefits – especially in respect to cost – yet there is no 
reason to assume that citizens will accept inferior levels of service, poor conduct or view 
volunteers to be any less accountable than those formally engaged by the organisation 
(Fredericksen and Levin, 2004). Failure to adopt systems whereby actors within police 
organisation can be held to account risks their legitimacy. Whilst being careful not to 
overstate the risk, the establishment of effective mechanisms of accountability are essential 
for promoting the legitimacy of constabularies and to the achievement of their wider 
aspirations including generating trust, confidence and cooperation of citizens in the execution 
of crime control (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Hough et al, 2010).  
 
Concluding comment 
In the context of a governmental project aimed at recalibrating the relationship between the 
state and citizens, significant cut backs in expenditure and never-ending demand for security 
from citizens, it is easy to see why constabularies have pursued the labour of PSVs. 
Volunteering in the police service is hardly new – Special Constables have been part of the 
landscape since (at least) the 1831 Special Constables Act – but matters of their deployment 
take on significance in a political landscape where the their role is being widely promoted, 
where their numbers have grown quickly and the functions they provide diversified. This is 
not a position unique to constabularies. However, the ‘unique’ position held by actors within 
constabularies – who hold significant real and symbolic power – demands that proper 
attention is paid to matters of regulation and accountability. To fail to do so risks legitimacy. 
Through forming a ‘bridge’ between officers and citizens, PSV Programmes have been 
presented as a way of fostering mutual knowledge and understanding between citizens, 
communities and constabularies and in so doing improving their legitimacy and effectiveness 
(NPIA, 2008; Neuberger, 2009).Whether these aspirations can be realised is at best unclear. 
We do not know what impact they are having on the ability of constabularies to meet 
organisational aims. The proliferation of volunteers into wide-ranging roles has occurred with 
little debate or scrutiny. That there are roles within constabularies that are suitable for 
volunteer, that most PSVs will be well-meaning and that PSV programmes may well bring 
benefits to the organisations that retain them cannot be denied. However, the impact of 
deploying PSVs on the public interest warrants empirical examination and the best ways of 
managing and supporting them given the wide-ranging roles that they appear to be playing 
needs consideration at the central and local levels.     
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